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A general explanation for the observer’s ability to judge the mean size of simple geometrical ﬁgures, such
as circles, was advanced. Results indicated that, contrary to what would be predicted by statistical
averaging, the precision of mean size perception decreases with the number of judged elements. Since
mean size discrimination was insensitive to how total size differences were distributed among individual
elements, this suggests that the observer has a limited cognitive access to the size of individual elements
pooled together in a compulsory manner before size information reaches awareness. Conﬁrming the
associative law of addition means, observers are indeed sensitive to the mean, not the sizes of individual
elements. All existing data can be explained by an almost general theory, namely, the Noise and Selection
(N&S) Theory, formulated in exact quantitative terms, implementing two familiar psychophysical
principles: the size of an element cannot be measured with absolute accuracy and only a limited number
of elements can be taken into account in the computation of the average size. It was concluded that the
computation of ensemble characteristics is not necessarily a tool for surpassing the capacity limitations
of perceptual processing.
 2013 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
Knowing how much Sir Francis Galton was obsessed with
counting, it is not surprising that, when he visited a livestock fair
in Plymouth in 1906, he collected all 787 ballots on which partic-
ipants of a weight-judging competition marked their guesses about
the weight of a particularly fat ox, after it was slaughtered and
dressed. Galton published a note in Nature, showing that, if the
democratic principle ‘‘one vote, one value’’ was applied, the mean
of all 787 guesses was only a pound off the actual weight of
1,198 lb, which was closer than the prediction made by any single
voter (e.g. Galton, 1907). James Surowiecki documented in his
well-received book this and many similar examples demonstrating
the wisdom of the crowd (Surowiecki, 2004). These demonstra-
tions served to rehabilitate, partly at least, the image of the crowd,
which was usually portrayed, at least since the publication of The
crowd (Le Bon, 1896), a famous book by Gustave Le Bon of France,
as sentimental, hysterical, and with an intellect equal to that of a
small child or a ‘‘savage.’’
Later studies, usually under the heading ‘‘intuitive statistician,’’
demonstrated that not only a crowd but also individual observers
can make, occasionally at least, remarkably accurate statistical
judgments (Peterson & Beach, 1967). Please have a brief look atll rights reserved.
ychology, University of Tartu,the following list of two-digit numbers and try to guess, immedi-
ately after reading, them what their arithmetic mean is. Here they
are: 54, 25, 79, 39, and 83. What was your guess? If your guess is
no more than few numbers off 56, then you may be proud of your
statistical intuition. Many studies have shown that human observ-
ers give estimates surprisingly close to the actual mean, even if the
amount of numbers approaches 20 or more and there is no time for
elaborate mental arithmetic (Anderson, 1967; Smith & Price, 2010).
A reasonable explanation is that we all have an intuitive number
sense which allows us to provide an approximate but reasonably
accurate solution to different statistical tasks (Dehaene, 2011;
Dehaene, Dehaene-Lambertz, & Cohen, 1998).
After replacing numbers with geometric ﬁgures, it was also no-
ticed that people can make fairly precise judgments about the
average size of several geometric objects, typically lines or circles
(Ariely, 2001; Chong & Treisman, 2003, 2005b; Fouriezos, Ruben-
feld, & Capstick, 2008; Miller & Sheldon, 1969; Spencer, 1961,
1963). These studies were mainly inspired by an observation that
the reduction of a set of similar items to a prototypical mean helps
to economize on the limited capacity of the visual system by
replacing multiple representations of individual elements with a
statistical summary characterizing the set as a whole (Ariely,
2001; Chong & Treisman, 2003; Chong et al., 2008). These studies
have also demonstrated that the mean size of a group of geometric
ﬁgures can be judged almost as precisely as the length of a single
line or the size of a circle. Applying statistical rules to the percep-
tion of mean size, one could expect that precision will increase
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sample mean improves with the square root of the sample size
(
p
N), it is also expected that mean size judgment would improve
with the square root of the elements to be judged (e.g. Fouriezos,
Rubenfeld, & Capstick, 2008). In fact, the precision of mean size
judgment is typically found to be independent of the number of
judged elements (Alvarez, 2011; Ariely, 2001; Chong & Treisman,
2005b; Fouriezos, Rubenfeld, & Capstick, 2008; Spencer, 1961,
1963), which indicates that the human observer is not fully able
to use the advantages of statistical aggregation. However, some
researchers have seen the irrelevance of the total number of ele-
ments as evidence that the process of perceptual averaging is car-
ried out automatically, presumably by an array of parallel
‘‘computers’’ (Alvarez, 2011; Ariely, 2001, 2008; Chong & Treisman,
2005b; Chong et al., 2008). The idea of involuntary and massively
parallel processing of mean size was substantially strengthened
by the ﬁnding that observers can fairly accurately report the aver-
age size of an array of geometric objects, even when they cannot
recall the size of individual elements in the array (Ariely, 2001;
Chong & Treisman, 2003, 2005a; Corbett & Oriet, 2011). Since
mean size can be computed without explicit knowledge about
individual elements, this has been taken as additional evidence
in favor of automated and parallel computing.
Nevertheless, in spite of considerable interest and an increasing
number of studies, the main properties of parallel and effortless
computation of mean size remain poorly understood. Even one of
the central claims that mean size can be computed outside of fo-
cused attention needs to be viewed with reservation since it was
demonstrated that all published evidence can be explained, in
principle at least, through various focused-attention strategies,
without invoking a special mechanism for average size perception
(Myczek & Simons, 2008; Simons & Myczek, 2008; Solomon, Mor-
gan, & Chubb, 2011). Indeed, all advocates of effortless and mas-
sively parallel computation assume, more or less explicitly, that
all or at least nearly all exposed elements are taken into account
in the judgment of the mean size. This premise, however, is very
difﬁcult to maintain, after many convincing demonstrations that
the observer is at times virtually blind to a substantial amount of
information. Several well-known phenomena such as the invisible
gorilla (Chabris & Simons, 2010; Simons & Chabris, 1999) and inat-
tentional (Simons, 2000) and change blindness (Simons & Rensink,
2005) suggest that the proposition about the use of all available
information is unrealistic. Many studies in the framework of ideal
observer analysis have also shown that, in numerous situations,
the observer is able to use only a fraction of available information
(Burgess et al., 1981; Raidvee et al., 2011; Rose, 1948). In the most
extreme example, Myczek and Simons (2008) demonstrated that
an observed precision of about 4–7% in the judgment of mean size
can be explained by assuming that only 2–3 elements are enough
to achieve accuracy in the mean size judgment observed.
Another reason why there is not a sufﬁciently general theory is
that the previous research on the perception of mean size has iden-
tiﬁed several vital but still facultative properties in the computa-
tion of average size. It was observed, for instance, how
concentration of attention (Alvarez & Oliva, 2008, 2009; Ariely,
2001), different visual cues (Alvarez, 2011; Chong & Treisman,
2005a), rapid temporal presentation (Corbett & Oriet, 2011; Joo
et al., 2009), minimally required exposure time (Whiting & Oriet,
2011), resistance to object substitution masking (Jacoby, Kamke,
& Mattingley, 2012) and previous adaptation (Corbett et al.,
2012) affect the ability to estimate mean size. Surprisingly little
attention has been paid to the deﬁning properties of the statistical
averaging process itself. For example, it is well known that the or-
der in which addends are summed does not change the end result.
Similarly, the grouping of added numbers does not affect the sum
(the associative law). If the observer’s task, for example, is todiscriminate the mean size of four circles in comparison to a refer-
ence, then it does not matter whether we add, for instance, 4 size
units to the diameter of only one of them or we add one size unit to
the diameters of all four circles. Intuitively, it is more likely that the
human observer can more easily notice an outlier which is 4 size
units larger than the reference size, rather than four small incre-
ments of 1 size unit added to each of the four circles. Albeit coun-
terintuitive, any theory insisting that the perceptual system is
capable of computing mean size must confront the challenge of
showing that these two cases result in an identical perceptual out-
come. Grouping these 4, or any other number of units, into differ-
ent packages does not affect the sum nor consequently, in theory,
the perception of the mean size. As far as we know, this very easily
falsiﬁable prediction has never been tested before.
The series of studies reported in this paper were conducted with
the goal of carrying out a systematic study of mean size perception.
In addition to testing some of the fundamental properties of statis-
tical averaging, we will propose a very simple and almost universal
explanation for a large range of facts related to the perception of
mean size. By theory, we understand a formal system expressed
in exact mathematical terms which is able to reproduce all obser-
ver response functions with the required accuracy. The proposed
theoretical explanation should be sufﬁciently general so that it de-
pends on only some universal stimulus attributes (number of ele-
ments, their sizes, etc.), not particular details (color of elements,
their exposure time, sharing of attention between two tasks, etc.)
which could vary from one situation to another, but have only mar-
ginal effects on mean size judgments. The proposed model is also
expected to contain a minimal number of free (to be determined)
parameters, all of which are anticipated to have a very transparent
psychological interpretation.
One of the two basic assumptions on which the proposed Noise
and Selection (N&S) Theory is based on, is that neither the size of a
single object nor the mean size of a set of objects can be measured
with absolute precision. The size of every single element must be
measured and transformed into its subjective representation. This
process of transformation is inherently noisy and the measured va-
lue varies from one trial to another, even if the physical size re-
mains constant. This means that the perceived size is
represented on a psychological continuum, with some positional
error, what Thurstone called ‘‘discriminal dispersion’’ (Thurstone,
1927a, 1927b). This dispersion is obviously not a constant, but
rather demonstrates a systematic relationship with some stimulus
parameters. One of the very ﬁrst attempts in the history of exper-
imental psychology established that the just noticeable difference
(JND) between two sizes increases approximately in proportion
to the total size of these objects (for a review see Wolfe, 1923).
The interest of the founders of experimental psychology as well
as the current researchers in this quantitative relationship, usually
known as Weber’s ‘‘law,’’ was mainly motivated by an understand-
ing that, from an error function of discrimination, it is possible to
recover the metrics that the observer is using to make decisions
about spatial intervals, or any other visual attribute (Dzhafarov &
Colonius, 2011). The existence of non-zero discriminal dispersion
means that, even if the number of processed elements is well with-
in capacity limitation, their size cannot be judged without error
(Im & Halberda, 2012; Solomon, Morgan, & Chubb, 2011).
On the other hand, we need to assume that, if the number of
judged elements exceeds the capacity of attention or working
memory, then it is very unlikely that all available information
can be processed. In order to explain experimental data, it is nec-
essary to assume that the observer’s decisions about a large num-
ber of elements may be actually based on a substantially smaller
subsample of these. When the number of judged elements exceeds
capacity limitation, a sizable number of elements is simply ignored
and the presence of the elements in the stimulus has no effect on
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lik, 2012). This selection principle means that the judged sizes of
individual elements are indeed pooled together, very much similar
to arithmetic addition or some other process comparable to sum-
mation, provided that addends are not all, but only a subsample,
of the displayed elements.
Both of these two principles – no size can be judged without
measurement error and not all elements are necessarily taken into
account – are well known to psychologists and are used as one of
the basic tools of psychophysical analysis. What is perhaps less
common is that the joint application of these two principles is suf-
ﬁcient to formulate a very simple model, the N&S theory, which is
able, with remarkable accuracy, to explain the majority of empiri-
cal facts established to date about mean size perception. Along
with the testing of basic axioms of addition, they constitute a suf-
ﬁciently general explanation for how human observers estimate
the mean size of simple geometric ﬁgures.2. General methods
There were four separate studies conducted to analyze the per-
ception of the mean size of geometric ﬁgures. Like many previous
researchers, we decided to study one of the simplest geometric
shapes – circles. Stimuli were presented on a ﬂat LCD monitor
screen, which was viewed from about 70 cm by an observer. From
this viewing distance, one pixel subtended about 2 min of arc. All
stimuli were generated and answers recorded by programs written
in MATLAB (The MathWorks, Inc.). Three observers with normal or
corrected to normal vision participated in all four studies.
Sets of circles with various sizes were presented on a display
screen for a short time period and observers had to indicate
whether the mean size of the test circles was larger than the pre-
viously seen reference circle by pressing the respective keys on
the keyboard. No feedback about the correctness was given. The
typical stimulus arrangement used in studies 1, 3, and 4 is shown
in Fig. 1.
The ﬁgure shows the central reference circle (dotted line),
which was switched off 0.5 s before the appearance of the test cir-
cles in 8 ﬁxed positions. These positions were placed on an imagi-
nary circle, with a radius equal to 375 pixels (approximately 16 in
diameter when viewed from a distance of 0.7 m). The width of the
contours was 2 pixels. The test circles were either smaller or largerFig. 1. A schematic view of stimulus consisting of 8 circles presented in the Study 1.
The reference circle (dotted) was removed before the presentation of the test
circles.than the size of the reference circle and, in this ﬁgure, they occupy
all 8 available positions. If the number of test circles N was less
than 8, then the non-occupied positions were chosen randomly.
The only exception to the general method was one series in
Study 2 which had a slightly different arrangement. In that series
of experiments, only two circles (test and reference) were exposed
simultaneously at equal horizontal distances from a central ﬁxa-
tion point. Observers were instructed to report which of the two
presented circles was larger in size. At the beginning of each trial,
a blue dot was exposed, marking the central ﬁxation point. The test
and reference circles were exposed for 500 ms. After each re-
sponse, there was 0.5 s pause before the next trial.3. Study 1: The precision of mean size judgment as a function of
the number of judged elements
As shown in several previous studies, precision in mean size
discrimination varies very little with the number of objects judged
(Alvarez, 2011; Ariely, 2001; Chong & Treisman, 2005b; Spencer,
1961, 1963). As noted above, from a statistical theory viewpoint,
such a result indicates that the precision of mean size computation
decreases with the number of elements. The precision of mean size
judgments is expected to improve with the square root of the
number of elements (
p
N), provided that the variance in judged
sizes remains fairly constant (e.g., Fouriezos, Rubenfeld, & Capstick,
2008). On the other hand, it is also ﬁrmly established that size
discrimination precision decreases nearly proportionally with the
length of the spatial extent being judged (Burbeck & Hadden,
1993; Solomon, Morgan, & Chubb, 2011; Wolfe, 1923). As an inev-
itable consequence, if the mean size of a set of geometric ﬁgures is
estimated on the basis of the total length of the judged attribute –
the total height of N lines, the cumulative diameter of N circles, etc.
– the precision of judgment is expected to increase proportionally
with the number of judged elements. For example, the stimulus
property that is supposedly judged in the eight-item (N = 8) display
must be eight times larger than the same property judged in the
single-item display. Since many previous studies have shown that
mean size judgment accuracy remains approximately invariant,
regardless of the total number of elements being judged, this poses
a challenge to any theory attempting to explain perception of mean
size. Interestingly, Daniel Kahneman noticed a substantial psycho-
logical difference between the average length of simple geometric
ﬁgures, such as lines, and their cumulative length (Kahneman,
2011). Without providing details, Kahneman claims that it is difﬁ-
cult, or even impossible, to compute the total length of a set of
lines at a glance, while it is easy—automatic and effortless—to reg-
ister the average length of these lines, just as it is easy to register
the color of these lines (Kahneman, 2011; see Fig. 8). Thus, an
experiment in which the total number of judged elements is varied
systematically is a rather crucial benchmark for various theories
explaining the perception of mean size.
In this study, we try to establish how the precision of mean size
judgment depends on the number of judged elements by looking
for a clue as to why the precision of mean size judgments does
not improve with the square root of the number of judged ele-
ments, as predicted by elementary statistical considerations.3.1. Methods
Sets with N = 1, 2, 4, and 8 circles were used to form separate
blocks in this study. Within each block of the experiment, the total
number of circles presented was kept constant, but their position
and size were varied from trial to trial. To construct the stimuli,
a set of base-circles was generated for each series so that the aver-
age of the set was equal to the size of the reference circle used,
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Fig. 2. Mean size discrimination curves as a function of the number of circles (N = 1, 2, 4, or 8) for the three observers. Blue circles and red rectangles represent the empirical
and the theoretical data, respectively. The dotted line is the cumulative normal distribution, with the parameters l and r providing the best ﬁt to both the empirical and the
simulated data. (For interpretation of the references to color in this ﬁgure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
1 Some readers may remember that JND is typically deﬁned as a 75% point of
correct discrimination. Since one percentage is not more ‘‘natural’’ than any other we
selected one standard deviation as a deﬁnition for the JND.
28 J. Allik et al. / Vision Research 83 (2013) 25–39which was 150 pixels in all trials. The base value for a single test
circle was 150 pixels or 6.4. For two test circles (N = 2), values
were 144 and 156 pixels. For four test circles (N = 4), four base
sizes were chosen: 138, 144, 156, and 162. For eight test circles
(N = 8), sizes were varied around the following basic values: 126,
132, 138, 144, 156, 162, 168, and 174. In each trial, the average size
of the presented stimuli was 2%, 4%, 6%, 8%, 10%, or 12% larger or
smaller than the size of the reference circle. To achieve this re-
quired difference in average size, diameters of the circles in the
corresponding base set were modiﬁed in two ways: the diameters
of all N base-circles were increased or decreased by delta (Dd) pix-
els or the diameter of only one randomly selected base-circle was
altered by NDd pixels. Here, Dd was calculated according to the
values in the corresponding base set and proposed mean size of
the ensemble. The only test-sets allowed were those in which
the difference between the diameter sizes of the largest and small-
est circles did not exceed half of the size of the reference. For
example, if the mean size of the eight test circles presented must
be 4% greater than the reference, then the stimulus may consist
of circles having diameters 126, 138, 144, 156, 162, 168, 174, and
180 pixels. Here Dd = 6 and 8Dd was added to the diameter of
the second circle in the corresponding base set. On average, there
were 80 trials for every condition.
3.2. Results and discussion
The mean size discrimination curves are shown in Fig. 2 as a
function of the number of circles for the three observers. The col-
umns correspond to the number of judged circles (N = 1, 2, 4, or8) and the rows represent the data of the three observers (J.A.,
K.A., and M.T.). The probabilities that observers indicated that the
mean size of N test objects was larger than the size of the reference
circle are shown as blue circles. All empirical psychometric data
were approximated with a cumulative normal distribution for
which the best ﬁtting values of the mean (l) and standard devia-
tion (r) were determined (shown in the inset to each panel). The
mean value l controls the horizontal position of the psychometric
function and is expected to ﬂuctuate around zero. Indeed, there
was no remarkable tendency to under- or overestimate the judged
size of test circles relative to the reference. The standard deviation
r characterizes the slope of the psychometric function, showing
the precision with which the mean size of the test elements could
be discriminated from the reference size. Since one standard devi-
ation corresponds to the 84.1 percentile point, sigma (r) can be
also interpreted as a measure of the JND: how many pixels the
mean test element size needs to be enlarged or shrunk compared
to the reference circle for the observer to tell the difference be-
tween them in 84.1% of cases.1
In all 12 panels, the best ﬁtting psychometric function is
remarkably close to the empirical data points (blue symbols). We
estimated the quality of ﬁt by computing the Pearson product cor-
relation between the observed and predicted data points. Since all
correlations were exemplarily high from 0.982 to 0.997 (median
J. Allik et al. / Vision Research 83 (2013) 25–39 290.991), we concluded that error accounted for a negligible amount
(typically about 1.9%) of the total variance.
If we compare the columns in Fig. 2 with one another, we can
see that the slopes of the psychometric functions do not systemat-
ically vary. It seems that the number of judged elements N seems
to have only a minor effect on the slope of the psychometric func-
tions (r), which automatically means JND. Although there were
considerable differences between the observers, the number of
judged elements had only insigniﬁcant effect on JND
[F(3,6) = 1.59, p = .287].
Since several studies have argued that not only the mean value
of sizes but also deviation from the mean plays an important role
in the mean size judgments (Fouriezos, Rubenfeld, & Capstick,
2008; Im & Halberda, 2012; Solomon, Morgan, & Chubb, 2011)
we also had a closer look at the variance of the test circles diame-
ters. Although we did not control the variance its average value in
separate trials increased with the number of test circles (of course
there was no variance when only one test circle was presented).
Nevertheless, these differences were too small to exert a consider-
able impact on the mean size judgments. For example, the average
standard deviation of diameter of four circles was 17.6 pixels and
eight circles 18.9 pixels. We analyzed in more details judgments
of the mean size of sets in which N = 8 test circles were presented
on the screen. The standard deviation in these sets varied from 14.7
to 23.3 pixels. When the answers across all observers were pre-
dicted from the mean size and standard deviation of each set of cir-
cles presented in a given trial only the mean size had a signiﬁcant
contribution (b = 0.58, p < .000001) while the role of standard devi-
ation was rather small (b = 0.02, p = .079). Thus, we have no evi-
dence that variance has been taken into consideration in mean
size judgments.
This implies that the observer’s judgments are mainly based on
the mean value of sizes and the precision with which the size of a
single circle is perceived is almost as good as the perception of the
mean size of eight circles. Thus, our results are in good agreement
with the previous literature, in which invariance from the number
of elements was repeatedly demonstrated (Alvarez, 2011; Ariely,
2001; Chong & Treisman, 2005b; Fouriezos, Rubenfeld, & Capstick,
2008; Spencer, 1961, 1963). There were occasional reports that the
increasing number of judged elements results in better accuracy
(e.g., Robitaille & Harris, 2011) but these studies suffer from a con-
siderable methodological problems. As a matter of fact, based on
statistical considerations, judgment of the mean size of the 8 ele-
ments is expected to be about 2.8 times more accurate than judg-
ment of a single element. At the same time, it almost certainly
rules out any explanation which assumes that observer judgments
are based on computing the total length of the perimeters of the
individual circles, since length increases in a linear manner with
the number of circles.
One possibility is to be satisﬁed with a phenomenological level
of explanation and speculate about possible reasons as to why
judgment of the mean size of eight circles is about
p
8 times less
efﬁcient than the size judgment of a solitary circle. Another option
is to move from these ‘‘half-way explanations’’ towards a more
elaborate description, which could identify the more atomistic
mechanisms responsible for the measurement of the size of each
individual element. As it turned out, a combination of two very
simple mechanisms routinely used in many psychophysical analy-
ses – additive noise and random selection – were able to explain all
obtained psychometric curves with sufﬁcient precision.2 We use this symbol (ﬁnal sigma) to distinguish it from another sigma r, which is
the habitual symbol for the standard deviation of the normal distribution.4. The proposed N&S model
We propose that the observer is indeed capable of measuring
the size (radius, diameter, circumference, or any other linearmeasure) of individual circles displayed, accurately summing these
measures and dividing them by the number addends which gives
the estimate of their mean size. This process of perceptual aggrega-
tion can be correctly understood by applying two very simple psy-
chophysical principles. First, directly following the Thurstonian
tradition, we assume that each individual act of measurement
can be only executed with a certain degree of unavoidable error,
which disperses the measured size randomly around a certain
mean value. Technically speaking, this means that a normally
distributed random value with a standard deviation equal to
1 (ﬁnal sigma)2 is added to each individual measurement result. This
implies that exactly the same size of some geometrical ﬁgure is
perceived to have slightly different subjective sizes on different
occasions. This measurement error caused by internal noise cannot
be suppressed or avoided by allocating attention to the processed
item. Strictly speaking we need to assume that the internal noise 1
increases with the size of measured element but since circles within
an experiment had not very remarkable size differences it is only the
average noise that matters.
The second proposal was that not all displayed elements are nec-
essarily taken into account in the decision-making process. If the
number of elements N exceeds capacity limits, then a smaller num-
ber of elements K is randomly selected from these N elements
(K < N). Although it would be more realistic to assume that the
selection process is not completely random and observers have cer-
tain preferences, we can still start from the simplifying assumption
that the selection process is nearly stochastic. The assumption of
random selection is not very restrictive, provided that all stimulus
conditions are randomized. Obviously, the ratio between the sam-
pled and presented elements K/N determines the precision of the
mean size judgment, which ismanifested in the slope of the psycho-
metric function. Thus, the selection principle assumes that themean
size is not always computed on all presented elements. Sometimes
only a fraction of these are used in the judgment of the mean size.
It was thus proposed that it is necessary to specify only two val-
ues – 1 and K – in order to reproduce an empirically obtained psy-
chometric function of mean size discrimination. In order to
simulate observer judgments, we wrote a simple simulation pro-
gram which was supplied with exactly the same values of the cir-
cle’s diameters as shown in the real experiments. If the number of
circles N surpassed the capacity limit K < N, then K elements out of
N were randomly selected for inspection. To the diameter of each
selected element, a random value was added. This pixel value
was randomly generated from a normal distribution N(0,1). These
diameters and the random values were added together and divided
by the number of addends K. If the mean value of these K addends
was larger than the diameter of the reference circle, then the
answer ‘‘larger’’ was selected. If the mean value was smaller than
that of the reference circle, then the answer ‘‘smaller’’ was given.
Finally, if the mean of these K addends was equal to the reference
size, then either answer, ‘‘smaller’’ or ‘‘larger’’, was chosen with
equal probability, 0.5. In order to eliminate statistical ﬂukes, all
simulations were replicated 100 times. This number of replications
was chosen because it was sufﬁcient to eliminate noticeable
random ﬂuctuations in the ﬁnal estimate.
Since it is unrealistic to expect observers to be able to select
exactly K elements in each trial, we allowed K to take not only
integer but also fractional values. These fractions have a very
simple interpretation. For example, K = 3.6 could mean that the
observer picks out 3 elements in 40% of all trials and 4 elements
in 60% of trials. Thus, fractions of K can be interpreted as a mixture
of different integer valued Ks in across a variety of trials.
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is a special case where the selected and presented numbers of ele-
ments are undeniably identical (K = N). This means that the slope
of the psychometric discrimination function (r) is solely deter-
mined by the internal noise (1) and unaffected by under-sampling.
Thus, we found a value for the internal noise (1) in the condition
where the size of a single circle was judged (N = 1), assuming that
the level of internal noise remains approximately the same as the
number of elements increases. Although this assumption may ap-
pear somewhat artiﬁcial, it is certainly more acceptable than sup-
posing that internal noise (1) increases proportionally with the
number of judged elements N. For each observer and each number
of circles N combination, a program searched for the best value of K
which could provide the closest ﬁt to both the observed data (blue
circles) and the points generated by the simulation model (red
rectangles). The optimal values of the N&S model, K and 1, are
shown in the inset to each panel. As can be seen, the simulated
model data are barely distinguishable from the empirically col-
lected data, both falling close to the best ﬁtting normal distribution
(see Fig. 2). As expected, in most cases simulated models fall al-
most perfectly along the cumulative normal distribution, which
provided the best ﬁt to the empirical psychometric functions. All
the correlations between the simulation ﬁt and the best ﬁtting psy-
chometric function were equal to 1.0. Since observers were not
able to press the response buttons with equal probability, all
empirical psychometric functions shown in Fig. 2 were shifted
slightly either to the right or left. Although these shifts were rather
small, they still may artiﬁcially increase the discrepancy between
the empirical results and the theoretical prediction. For this very
reason, the predictions for all models were shifted l units along
the abscissa so that the mean response would be equal to 0.5. As
this kind of transformation would further prohibit the direct appli-
cation of discrete computational methods in the assessment of
model ﬁt, we chose to compare the empirical and theoretical
curves via the best ﬁtting cumulative normal distribution. In addi-
tion to visual inspection, more formal approximation statistics –
the percentage of explained variance – also conﬁrm very good
agreement between the empirical data and the predictions of the
two-parameter model. Since both the empirical and theoretical
points ﬁtted exactly the same cumulative normal distribution al-
most ﬂawlessly, it is possible to conclude that the proposed model
provides a realistic picture of what is going on in the head of the
observer when she or he is estimating the mean size.
It is very satisfying that such a simple model, the N&S model,
with only two free parameters, the number of randomly selected
elements K and the magnitude of internal noise 1, is able to predict
mean size judgments so well. It was slightly surprising that, accord-
ing to the proposedmodel, observers started to omit elements, even
if therewere only two of these on the screen (cf. Solomon,Morgan, &
Chubb, 2011). When there were 8 circles to judge, observers be-
haved as if they were able to notice the size of only approximately
one-half of them. Not knowing exactly what could happen if the
number of presented elements exceeded 8, processing capacity
seems to indeed be less than the magical number 7 (Miller, 1956)
andmore close to an equallymagic 4 (Cowan, 2001). This conclusion
may need a revision since there were reports that observers’ accu-
racy ofmean size judgmentswas betterwith the entire display com-
pared to the presentation of only subsamples (Chong et al., 2008;
Experiment 2). Also, recently Im and Halberda (2012) reported ﬁnd-
ings that 7 individual sizes were used in the mean size computation
which certainly overpass the above mentioned capacity limitations.
However, this estimate 7 individual sizes is very likely mistaken be-
cause it is based on awrong equationwhich ignores the fact that the
internal noise depends on the number of judged elements and in the
case of the comparative judgements a correction by a factor
p
2
should be applied (cf., Thurstone, 1927a, Case V).These results provide an answer to the question of why mean
size judgment does not improve as the square root of the number
of judged elements increases. The explanation, in terms of the
proposed model, is rather obvious. With an increase in the number
of displayed elements, observers were not able to attend to all ele-
ments, but only a fraction of them. As the number of presented ele-
ments increased, the number of unattended elements increased as
well. This indicates that, in terms of the ideal observer analysis, the
observer’s performance decreases with an increase in the number
of displayed elements. Previous researchers were obviously mis-
taken in assuming that the observed indifference to the total num-
ber of presented elements hints to the use of a global, parallel
process that extracts a statistical summary of the average size of
simple geometric objects in the display (Alvarez, 2011; Alvarez &
Oliva, 2008; Ariely, 2001, 2008; Chong & Treisman, 2003, 2005b;
Chong et al., 2008). Even if it is a global, parallel process that
computes a statistical summary, it is obvious that the efﬁciency
of this process decreases as the number of displayed elements in-
creases. The invariance of the number of the judged elements can
be explained by the fact that an increasing number of elements are
ignored by the observer.
Therefore, our results are in better accordance with the views of
those few skeptics who have been suggesting that the results of
mean size perception can be explained through various focused-
attention strategies, without appealing to somewhat obscure mas-
sively parallel and effortless mechanisms (De Fockert & Marchant,
2008; Myczek & Simons, 2008; Simons & Myczek, 2008; Solomon,
Morgan, & Chubb, 2011). Even if details of our proposed explana-
tion turn out to need some correction, it still provides indisputable
evidence that the averaging of all the items in the display is not a
requirement to explain perception of the mean size.5. Study 2: The just noticeable difference as a function of
reference size
All hypotheses concerning the human ability to compute statis-
tical summaries need to start from the assumption thatwhatever vi-
sual attributes we talk about – size, orientation, color, etc. – it is
inevitable to have some perceptual mechanism which is able to
measure this physical attribute and transform it into an internal
representation. If we talk, for example, about computing the average
size of an ensemble of objects, then we need to postulate an ability
to measure and represent the size of each of these objects, whether
they are presented alone or together with some other similar ob-
jects. Perhaps it is not a coincidence that one of the ﬁrst observa-
tions, pivotal in the birth of experimental psychology, was the
observer’s ability to discriminate between two spatial intervals
(Burbeck & Hadden, 1993; Wolfe, 1923). Before proceeding to the
question of how the average size of an ensemble is computed, we
need to establish a benchmark by demonstrating how the size of a
single object is measured. For instance, it was noticed alreadymany
years ago that measurements of subjective length are very similar,
whether they concern the length of a single geometric object or
the average length of a collection of similar geometric objects (Mill-
er & Sheldon, 1969). The purpose of this study is to test how the
absolute size of judged elements affects the JND: whether it is the
size of a single object or it is the mean size of a group of objects.5.1. Methods
In this study, we run two series of experiments. In the ﬁrst of
these two series, the size of a single circle was judged relative to
a reference one. Two circles, the test and the reference, were pre-
sented in each trial. The diameter of one of the two circles was kept
constant (the reference) for all trials, while the diameter of the
J. Allik et al. / Vision Research 83 (2013) 25–39 31second circle (the test) was randomly chosen from a set of circles
with diameters 1%, 2%, 4%, 6%, 8%, or 10% larger or smaller than
the reference. In the three different experiment blocks, we used a
reference circle with a diameter 75, 150, or 300 pixels. The diame-
ters of test circles ranged from 68–83, 135–165, and 270–330 pix-
els, respectively.
Circles were drawn at a distance approximately equal to the
diameter of the reference presented on the left and right of the
central ﬁxation point. To avoid circle alignment as a potential cue,
the locations of the centers of the presented circles were varied ran-
domly in the window at a distance 5% of the size of the reference.
The position of the test circle (to the left or right side) in reference
to the central ﬁxation point was chosen randomly in each trial.
The design of the second series was identical to Study 1. Four
test circles were presented in eight possible positions, which were
randomly selected. Like the ﬁrst series, there were three different
experiment blocks for the reference circle, with a diameter of 75,
150, or 300 pixels. The test circle diameters were in the range of
10% to +10% of the reference size. The observer’s task was, like
in the previous study, to indicate whether the mean size of the four
test circles was smaller or larger than the reference circle.
5.2. Results and discussion
Fig. 3 demonstrates the mean size discrimination probabilities
for the three different reference sizes (75, 150, and 300 pixels)
and for the three observers (J.A., K.A., and M.T.). Panel 3A−7 −4 −1 2 5 8
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Fig. 3. Mean size discrimination probabilities and approximation functions for three diff
M.T.). Blue and red symbols represent empirical and theoretical data, respectively. (For in
the web version of this article.)corresponds to judgments of a single circle and panel 3B to the
judgment of the mean size of 4 circles. In addition to the empirical
data (blue circles), results of the best simulation model (red rectan-
gles) are shown. Empirical data were again distributed very closely
to a cumulative normal distribution. The correlations between ob-
served and predicted data varied from .939 to .998 (median .995),
showing superb ﬁt.
Simulating data of the judgment of a single circle, it was natural
to suppose that K = 1: the observer is attentive throughout all trials
and can judge the size in each of them. In the inset to each ﬁgure, it
is shown that the best predicting value of 1 increases nearly pro-
portionally with the size of the reference circle. When judgments
of the mean size of 4 circles were simulated (Fig. 3B), the model’s
free parameters K and 1 were allowed to vary freely in order to
search for the best ﬁtting combination of these two parameters.
As shown in the insets to each ﬁgure, the value of K remains fairly
stable, being on average equal to 2.2, 3.1, and 2.4 for observers J.A.,
K.A., and M.T., respectively. It looks as if only 2–3 elements were
taken into account in the judgment of the mean size of all four ele-
ments. What is remarkable is a nearly proportional increase in the
standard deviation 1 with an increase of the reference size.
In order to observe the relationship between JND and the refer-
ence size more transparently, we plotted, in Fig. 4, the standard
deviations in pixels as a function of the reference size, also in pixels
(please remember that one pixel was about 2 min of arc). Since all
data points lay sufﬁciently close to a line, this indicates that the
Weber law holds for both the judgment of a single circle and the3 9 15
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Fig. 3. (continued)
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three participants (J.A., K.A., and M.T.).
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J. Allik et al. / Vision Research 83 (2013) 25–39 33mean size of four circles. In both cases, JND increases in proportion
with the judged size. What is different, however, is the slope for
Weber’s function: JND increases more rapidly when it concerns
the mean size judgment of four circles. This indicates that the pre-
cision of the mean size judgment of multiple objects is less precise
than the judgment of a single object. The obtained result is
obviously not in accordance with those theories which claim that
the mean size of a group of geometric ﬁgures can be judged almost
as precisely as the length of a single line or the size of a circle
(Alvarez, 2011; Ariely, 2001; Chong & Treisman, 2005b).
The fact that the internal noise 1 increases nearly proportionally
with the size of the circle must have some obvious consequences to
the proposed N&S model. In the current version of the model a ran-
dom value with the same standard deviation 1 was added to each
individual measurement result irrespective of its absolute size. A
more realistic model requires that the magnitude of noise will be
in the proportion to the circle’s diameter. However, the range of
the test circles’ diameters in each trial was rather small. For that rea-
son making the added noise proportional to the circle’s diameter
only negligibly changed themodel’s predictions. Thus, we are aware
that the internal noise increases with the size of the test elements
but because of pragmatic reasons do nothing since model’s predict-
ing accuracy improves minimally. Probably for the same reason the
exact form of the psychophysical function for the perceived size
(Teghtsoonian, 1965) has only theoretical and very little practical
importance in the context of the current experimental paradigm.6. Study 3: Testing the associative law of addition
One obvious shortcoming of many previous studies of ensemble
characteristics—any abstract property of an incoming visual image
which is computed from multiple individual measures—is the fail-
ure to test the fundamental properties of the operations that are re-
quired for the computation of these properties. Of course, it is
extremely important to know, for instance, what is the minimal
exposure time needed for mean size estimation (Whiting & Oriet,
2011) or how allocation of attention affects judgment precision
(Alvarez & Oliva, 2008; Ariely, 2001; Haberman & Whitney,
2011), but these and other properties tell very little about the aver-
aging process itself. As was stressed above, surprisingly little atten-
tion has been paid to the deﬁning properties of the statistical
averaging process, or, simply, addition. For example, it takes only
two elements to average. If people, indeed, could see a statistical
summary of the individual elements in the display, it is sufﬁcient
to present only two elements, and ask observers to judge the aver-
age size of these. Since two elements almost certainly do not exceed
the capacity of the focused attention strategy, proponents of com-
puting ensemble characteristics can prove their theories using, log-
ically, the minimal number of elements for averaging, that is, two.
As we have mentioned above, there are several fundamental
properties of averaging that have never been critically tested. For
example, every schoolchild learns that the order in which addends
are summed does not change the end result (the commutative
law). Similarly, the grouping of added numbers does not affect
the sum (the associative law). For example, (4 + 1) + (4 + 1) is ex-
pected to give exactly the same result 10 as is the case with a
slightly different grouping 4 + (4 + 2). If the observer’s task, for
example, is to discriminate the mean size of two circles in compar-
ison to a reference, then it does not matter whether we add 2 size
units to the diameter of only one of them or we add one size unit to
the diameters of two circles. Intuitively, it is more likely that the
human observer can more easily notice an outlier which is 2 size
units larger than the reference size, rather than two small incre-
ments of 1 size unit added to each of the two circles. Any theory
insisting that the perceptual system is capable of computing themean size must demonstrate that these two cases will result in
identical perceptual outcomes. Otherwise we need to assume that
the mean size is inferred, not on the basis of arithmetic aggrega-
tion, but rather some other operation which does not obey the
associative law. As far as we know, this very easily falsiﬁable pre-
diction has never been tested before.
6.1. Methods
In each trial, the mean size of two test circles was compared to
the size of a previously seen reference circle. One circle was drawn
188 pixels to the left and the second 188 pixels to the right of the
central ﬁxation point. In each trial, the mean size of the presented
stimuli was 1%, 2%, 4%, 6%, 8%, or 10% larger or smaller than the size
of the reference (150 pixels). Two base-sets of circles with diame-
ters – [132, 168] and [150, 150] – were constructed. The diameters
of both circles from chosen base-set were increased (decreased) by
delta (Dd) or the diameter of only one of the base circles was al-
tered by 2Dd, before presentation. The observer’s task was to indi-
cate whether the mean size of the two test circles was smaller or
larger than the reference circle.
6.2. Results and discussion
As it turned out, it was largely irrelevant whether the diameter
of the both circles was modiﬁed by Dd pixels or only one of them
was altered by 2Dd pixels. Fig. 5 shows the results of the mean size
judgments for equal (Ref = 150) and unequal (Ref = 132/168) base
test sizes.
Unlike the number of modiﬁed elements (adding 2Dd to one or
Dd to two elements), the similarity of sizes of the two judged cir-
cles had a substantial effect on judgment precision. All three
observers were signiﬁcantly more accurate in the judgment of
the mean size of two approximately equal circles than two circles
where one was clearly smaller and the other clearly larger than the
reference size. When we simulated empirical data with the noise
and selection model, the estimated internal variance was substan-
tially smaller for the approximately equal-sized circles (Ref = 150)
than for the unequal-sized circles (Ref = 132/168).
To demonstrate the effect of these two factors – the number of
changed elements and the disparity in sizes – we aggregated data
for all three observers and plotted these in Fig. 6. It can be clearly
seen that modiﬁcation in the size of only one circle (ﬁlled symbols)
is not very different to modiﬁcation of both elements (empty sym-
bols). What really matters is whether the sizes of judged elements
were approximately equal (blue symbols) or there was a consider-
able size disparity between their sizes (red symbols). A normal
cumulative approximation shows that the slope of the psychomet-
ric function is considerably steeper for about equal-sized circles
(r = 10.96) than it is for unequal sized circles (r = 16.73). Thus,
there was approximately a 6-pixel or 12-min-of-arc difference in
mean size discrimination performance, which worsened when cir-
cles had unequal sizes.
Strictly speaking, this may be seen as a violation of the laws of
arithmetic. Any calculator is expected to ﬁnd that (132 + 168)/2 is
equal to (150 + 150)/2. Although there was a general tendency for
test circles to appear slightly larger than the reference size (the
mean of the psychometric function was shifted toward the positive
values l = 5.67 and 5.06, for one and two element change respec-
tively), these mean values were nevertheless approximately equal.
Thus, the main problem is in the precision, not in the ability to
compute the mean value. The perceptual system is considerably
more precise in the computation of the mean size of approximately
equal addends than addends which have a signiﬁcant size dispar-
ity. One possible interpretation is that the precision of internal rep-
resentation depends on the dispersion of the judged values. Models
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Fig. 5. The mean size discrimination curves for the three observers when the diameter of the both circles was modiﬁed by Dd pixels (upper panel, Ref = 132/168) or only one
of them was altered by 2Dd pixels (lower panel, Ref = 150). Blue and red dots represent empirical and theoretical data, respectively. (For interpretation of the references to
color in this ﬁgure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
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34 J. Allik et al. / Vision Research 83 (2013) 25–39that were inspired by the signal detection theory postulate that the
observer is also sensitive to variance of the designated stimulus
property (Solomon, Morgan, & Chubb, 2011). More simple explana-
tion is that if the judged values concentrate around one location on
the internal number line (Dehaene, 2011), then each value can be
represented with a higher precision than those values that land
on disparate positions of the internal representation. In other
words, it seems that the human observer can concentrate on onlyone particular region of the internal number line and performs
worse when she or he must attend to two or more different regions
of the internal number line simultaneously.
The most interesting result, however, was that approximately
the same outcome was obtained in the two conditions in which
size increments were added or decrements were subtracted either
from only one circle or equally from both. Perhaps unexpectedly,
these two conditions (empty versus ﬁlled symbols) were practi-
cally identical. For the observers, it made no difference whether,
say, 12 pixels were added to the size of only one circle or 6 pixels
to both circles to make them distinctly separate from the size of
the etalon. In short, the observers were sensitive to the mean size
of two circles, not to the sizes of individual elements in isolation.
Had one of the two elements been presented separately, its differ-
ence from the etalon size would certainly have been noted, even
though, in the presence of another test circle, perhaps because it
does not carry relevant information, it remains unnoticed. The fact
that the observers were sensitive to mean size, ignoring the size of
individual elements, seems to suggest that they may have a limited
cognitive access to the size of individual elements. One unlikely
explanation is that the observer simply follows instruction and
ignores the size of individual element even if it could provide an
easier answer for the posed question. Unfortunately, instructions
are not sufﬁcient to guarantee that the observer’s judgment is
based solely on the designated property of the presented stimuli
(Nachmias, 2006). We have no knowledge of any demonstrations
according to which the observer can follow exactly instructions
even if a more easy solution is available. Previous studies have also
shown that fairly good discrimination of the mean size can be
achieved, even when observers cannot recall the size of individual
elements (Ariely, 2001; Chong & Treisman, 2003; Corbett & Oriet,
2011). Only when the summary size difference reached a critical
level did observers reliably discriminate the mean difference from
the reference size. Awareness of the size of individual elements
seems to be blocked by the presence of another element. The other
side of the same coin is compulsory averaging. The presence of
J. Allik et al. / Vision Research 83 (2013) 25–39 35another element on the display and the task to estimate the mean
size do not lead to loss of information, which seems to happen as
part of another perceptual phenomenon known as visual crowding
(Levi, 2008; Pelli, Palomares, & Majaj, 2004). In the judgment of
mean size, we are obviously dealing with compulsory averaging,
where individual size information is not lost but rather combined
into the perception of an ensemble characteristic, the mean size
of which is computed on the basis of at least two separate ele-
ments. It is important to notice that even in this simplest case sta-
tistical representation reduces the information needed to preserve
by 50% (cf., Ariely, 2001; Chong & Treisman, 2003).
Compulsory averaging is not an unknown concept in the
explanation of visual perception. For example, it was previously re-
ported that, despite their inability to report the orientation of an
individual patch, observers can reliably estimate average orienta-
tion, demonstrating that orientation information is pooled, even
though components may not be individually identiﬁable (Parkes
et al., 2001). Also in random-dot cinematograms, the observer is
unaware of individual displacements but is nevertheless able to
compute and perceive a vector sum of these individual displace-
ments (Allik, 1992; Allik & Dzhafarov, 1984). Since mean size dis-
crimination performance depends critically on the total size
difference of the judged elements from the reference, not how this
total difference is distributed among individual test elements, it is
also possible to conclude that compulsory pooling of size informa-
tion happens before information about size reaches awareness.
Since the associative law of addition was shown to be preserved,
this study provided rigorous proof for the perception of ensemble
characteristics.7. Study 4: Compulsory pooling of size information
The surprising discovery that the associative law holds in the
perception of the mean size of two circles obviously needs further
elaboration. If the observer’s task, for example, is to discriminate
the mean size of four circles in comparison to a reference, then it
does not matter whether we add four size units to the diameter
of only one of them or we add one size unit to the diameters of
all four circles. Intuitively, it is more likely that the human observer
can more easily notice an outlier which is four size units larger
than the reference size, rather than four small increments of one
size unit added to each of the four circles. Again, any theory insist-
ing that the perceptual system is capable of computing the mean
size must predict that the two cases result in an identical percep-
tual outcome. Grouping these four, or any other number of units,
into different packages does not affect the mean value and, conse-
quently, the perception of the mean size.−18−12 −6 0 6 12 18
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Fig. 7. Mean size discrimination probabilities with the best theoretical approximation fu
(For interpretation of the references to color in this ﬁgure legend, the reader is referred7.1. Methods
The design of this study was similar to the case N = 4 of Study 1.
Here the base-set consists of four circles with diameters equal to
the size of reference circle (150 pixels). In each trial, the average
size of the presented stimuli was 1%, 2%, 4%, 6%, 8%, or 10% larger
or smaller than size of the reference circle. These required values
for average sizes were obtained by increasing or decreasing the
diameters of the base-circles. A difference delta (Dd) between
150 and the required mean size was distributed, as evenly as pos-
sible, among base-circles in three ways: the diameters of all base-
circles were increased or decreased by Dd pixels, or the diameters
of two base-circles were increased or decreased by 2Dd pixels, or
the diameter of only one base-circle was altered by 4Dd pixels.
Thus, in three different conditions, one, two, or all four elements
were different from the reference size, although the summary
change was always identical.
7.2. Results and discussion
Similarly to the previous study, the way in which the summary
increment or decrement was distributed among individual ele-
ments had only negligible effect on the discrimination of mean
size. Observers discriminated displays in which the diameter of
only one circle was modiﬁed by 4Dd pixels almost equally as well
as displays in which all 4 base-circles were enlarged or diminished
by Dd pixels. Fig. 7 demonstrates the empirical psychometric func-
tions for the three observers, irrespective of the number of circles
(1, 2, or 4) in which the diameter was modiﬁed. Again, it was easy
to ﬁnd a combination of K and 1 values of the N&Smodel, providing
the best ﬁt (red rectangles) to the empirical data. Like the previous
studies, observers’ data were explained as if they were able to take
into account only 2–3 elements out of the four, in addition to a
considerable amount of internal noise, which ranged from about
4 to 12 pixels.
Psychometric functions aggregated across three observers for
the one (green), two (blue), and four (red) elements for which size
was increased or decreased are shown in Fig. 8. The choice proba-
bility is plotted against the mean size difference from the refer-
ence. Since the slopes of all three psychometric functions were
close to 5.9 pixels, this means that it was necessary to enlarge or
diminish one of the four circles by about 23.6 pixels to make it dis-
tinguishable from the reference. If we compare this value with the
respective 1 values in Study 1 (N = 1), then we see that it is mini-
mally 2–3 times above the discrimination threshold. When the size
of two of the elements was altered, a discrimination probability of
84.1% was achieved, with about Ds = 11.8 pixels, which is also the
discrimination threshold of a solitary circle. This could only mean
that observers were unaware of the sizes of the individual0 6 12 18
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Fig. 8. Psychometric functions aggregated across three observers for one (green),
two (blue), and four (red) elements, the size of which was increased or decreased.
(For interpretation of the references to color in this ﬁgure legend, the reader is
referred to the web version of this article.)
36 J. Allik et al. / Vision Research 83 (2013) 25–39elements, and all their responses are guided only by the mean size,
which is pooled together across sizes of all elements they were
able to take into account.8. General discussion
8.1. The perception of ensemble characteristics
An ensemble characteristic is usually deﬁned as any attribute
that is computed from multiple individual measures combining
them either across space or time (Alvarez, 2011). One of the most
essential properties of ensemble characteristics is that they repre-
sent a whole set of objects so that there may not be a single indi-
vidual item which embodies this ensemble characteristic (Ariely,
2001). Thus, with ensemble characteristics, it is impossible that
the observer could confuse introspection with inspection, what
Titchener called The Stimulus Error (Titchener, 1912), since these
properties can only exist in the consciousness which is induced by
a brief exposure of the stimuli. Ensemble characteristics have been
presented under various names, including ‘gestalt properties,’
‘stimulus prototypes,’ or ‘statistical summaries’ (Alvarez, 2011),
and they have served as paradigmatic examples for different re-
search traditions, including gestalt psychology and various waves
of the cognitive revolution. With this historical background, it is
understandable why the perception of statistical properties has at-
tracted such an interest. Beside mean length (Ariely, 2001; Miller
& Sheldon, 1969), orientation (Dakin & Watt, 1997; Miller & Shel-
don, 1969; Parkes et al., 2001), spatial position (Alvarez & Oliva,
2008; Morgan, Hole, & Glennerster, 1990; Morgan et al., 2012),
and luminance (Bauer, 2009), it is also claimed that the human
observer is able to compute average emotion (Haberman & Whit-
ney, 2009), or even average sex (Haberman & Whitney, 2007).
What appears to make ensemble characteristics particularly
attractive is a conviction that these properties are supposedly
computed automatically by an effortless and parallel array of
mechanisms which can operate beyond the severe capacity limita-
tions imposed by attention and short term memory (Alvarez,
2011; Ariely, 2001; Chong & Treisman, 2003, 2005b). This maybe, however, a simpliﬁcation since one of the leading researchers
has maintained that he has never thought that statistical sum-
mary can be computed via powerful parallel processer that has
unlimited capacity (Sang Chul Chong, personal communication,
December 9, 2012).
One of the main arguments in favor of effortless and massively
parallel processing is judgment accuracy, which typically varies in
the range of 4%  12%. But, as was shown in this and several pre-
vious studies (Myczek & Simons, 2008; Simons & Myczek, 2008),
this precision does not guarantee that all displayed elements will
be taken into account in the judgment of the mean size or some
other perceptual attribute. The observed judgment precision can
be explained, principally at least, by assuming that only 2–4 ele-
ments are inspected and their parameters are used for the inferring
of the average size.
One of the most serious disappointments arising from previous
studies was the failure to provide solid proof that the human ob-
server indeed computes the mean size or anything else which is
a sufﬁciently good proxy for the statistical average. Previous
research was able to demonstrate, in the best case, only that the
observer’s judgments were not based on some other statistical
parameters such as minimum, maximum, median, or variance
(Ariely, 2001; Chong & Treisman, 2003; Fouriezos, Rubenfeld, &
Capstick, 2008). However, there is some clear evidence that
observers are not able to follow instructions exactly and substitute
the computation of the statistical mean with some other statistical
measure. For example, it was shown that the critical ratio, the fore-
runner to the modern t test, was the most important predictor of
intuitive judgments about the sizes of groups of similar objects
(Fouriezos, Rubenfeld, & Capstick, 2008). There is also some evi-
dence about the tendency to ignore extremely small and large
stimulus values in the calculation of the mean (de Gardelle & Sum-
merﬁeld, 2011). In most cases, the ability of statistical averaging is
presumed rather than tested with logical argument or a consistent
experimental procedure. Since computing a statistical summary
presumes abiding by axioms of addition, it was, as we believe,
quite a fresh idea to test whether the associative law holds when
the observer’s task is to estimate the mean size. There was a very
high risk that the associative law of addition would be falsiﬁed,
since, intuitively, it is very likely that the observer would notice
the size of an outlier rather than average size of the whole set of
displayed elements. Two studies (Studies 3 and 4) provided, how-
ever, a very deﬁnite answer: observers’ judgments were indeed
based on the mean size, not the sizes of any individual element
in isolation. This may be seen as a paradox, since having enough
time to inspect static images, like the one shown in Fig. 1, most
people would immediately notice that one circle is conspicuously
smaller or larger than the rest. Nevertheless, with a relatively short
exposure time and the task to estimate the mean size, the observer
seems to be almost completely unaware of the size of the individ-
ual elements. In spite of this ignorance, the sizes of the individual
elements are pooled together to give an impression of the mean
size in an apparently compulsory manner. There is evidence that
compulsory pooling operates, for example, in the perception of ori-
entation (Parkes et al., 2001), selecting location for saccade landing
(Van der Stigchel, Heeman, & Nijboer, 2012), and motion direction
in random-dot patterns (Allik, 1992; Allik & Dzhafarov, 1984), but
we are unaware of direct proof of compulsory pooling in the per-
ception of mean size. Since mean size discrimination performance
depends critically on total size difference, not how this total differ-
ence is distributed among individual elements, it is also possible to
conclude that compulsory pooling of size information happens be-
fore information about size reaches awareness. In sum, this was
the ﬁrst rigorous proof that the perceptual system indeed can com-
pute a statistical summary or any other statistic which satisﬁes the
associative law of addition.
J. Allik et al. / Vision Research 83 (2013) 25–39 37An ability to compute and perceive ensemble characteristics is
usually perceived as a remedy to an established bottleneck in fo-
cused attention and working memory, both of which are able to
handle a few objects only. Once the precision argument is placed
into doubt, there are very few arguments left in favor of the global
parallel process of extraction of a statistical summary of the aver-
age size of the objects in the display. One of these arguments is the
replicable observation that the precision of mean size judgment is
nearly independent of the number of judged elements (Alvarez,
2011; Ariely, 2001, 2008; Chong & Treisman, 2003, 2005a,
2005b; Chong et al., 2008). Apparently by a misleading analogy
with reaction-time data in visual search tasks, it was concluded
that a ﬂat response function speaks in favor of a practically unlim-
ited perceptual capacity (Alvarez, 2011; Ariely, 2001, 2008; Chong
& Treisman, 2005b; Chong et al., 2008). Since statistical aggrega-
tion predicts improvement of mean size judgments with the num-
ber of judged elements, an almost ﬂat response curve is a ﬁrm sign
of a decrease in precision. Results of this and previous studies
(Myczek & Simons, 2008; Simons & Myczek, 2008) cannot sustain
the optimism that the ability to compute statistical averages is an
evolutionary adaptation for surpassing the capacity limitations of
focused attention and working memory. In this study, the compul-
sory pooling of information was fully operational when the num-
ber of processed elements did not exceed the capacity of
information processing. Two or even four elements are clearly
within the limits of both focused attention and short-termmemory
(Cowan, 2001; Miller, 1956). This seems to suggest that research-
ers who have advocated for the perception of ensemble character-
istics were partly wrong in assuming, tacitly at least, that the
existence of this ability automatically implies an effortless and
massively parallel processing capability which can surpass a fo-
cused attention bottleneck (Alvarez, 2011; Ariely, 2001). Among
the general public and some researchers, it has become fashionable
to argue that intuitive and automatic methods of cognition, the
perception of ensemble characteristics being one of them, are
superior to more deliberate and analytic methods (Chabris & Si-
mons, 2010; Kahneman, 2011). However, just as inconsistent are
those researchers who may have thought that the focused atten-
tion strategy is incompatible with the perception of ensemble
characteristics (Myczek & Simons, 2008; Simons & Myczek,
2008). Perhaps one of the most remarkable conclusions of this
study is the observation that focused attention and the perception
of ensemble characteristics do not exclude each other. As we were
able to demonstrate, the observer can concentrate on a small num-
ber of elements but nevertheless perceive them in a holistic man-
ner by extracting attributes which belong to a group of elements,
not to any one of them in isolation.8.2. What is new in the N&S theory?
All components of the proposed N&S theory are well-known
and widely used. For example, Myczek and Simons (2008) demon-
strated that most existing data on the mean size perception can be
explained by sampling a subset of elements each of which is repre-
sented accurately and free of any noise. Most other explanations
use the idea of noisy internal representation but make a tacit
assumption that all available information is used in the judgments
of the mean size (Alvarez, 2011; Ariely, 2001; Chong & Treisman,
2003; Fouriezos, Rubenfeld, & Capstick, 2008). Only in a very few
studies the both principles – selection and noise – were applied
simultaneously to integration of local visual information into
summary statistics (Dakin, 2001; Im & Halberda, 2012; Solomon,
Morgan, & Chubb, 2011). These studies conﬁrmed that not only
the noise but also under sampling that limits the mean size or ori-
entation judgment of multiple objects.Evidently, the perception of the mean size cannot be a very
demanding ability since a quite primitive neural network is able
to compute the mean size of a collection of geometric ﬁgures (Šetic,
Svegar, & Domijan, 2007). These authors demonstrated that a two-
dimensional neural network with three layers can compute some-
thing similar to the mean size. However, there is no hint of how
this network will behave if, for example, the number of judged ele-
ments increases or size increments are equally distributed be-
tween all elements or allocated to only few of them. These
models that are more speciﬁc about relevant aspects of the mean
size or orientation perception are usually inspired by techniques
used in engineering and exploit terminology of the signal detection
theory (Im & Halberda, 2012; Solomon, 2010; Solomon, Morgan, &
Chubb, 2011). For example, the equivalent-noise approach is a way
to measure the amount of internal noise by adding external noise
to a stimulus and determine the point at which subject’s perfor-
mance begins to deteriorate (Dakin, 2001; Dakin & Watt, 1997;
Im & Halberda, 2012; Solomon, Morgan, & Chubb, 2011). Without
any doubt, the closest model to the N&S was proposed by Solomon,
Morgan, and Chubb (2011) which was speciﬁcally tailored for the
equivalent-noise approach. Similarity between these two models
is not surprising because so far none of the proposed explanations
have managed to escape fundamental Thurstonian postulate that
visual attributes cannot be recorded without making measurement
errors and which distributions are sufﬁciently close to Gaussian
function. The both models also use the idea of statistical efﬁciency
meaning that from the total available sample of elements only a
fraction is used for judgment. In details, however, there are several
relevant differences between the N&S model and the explanation
proposed by the equivalent-noise approach (Im & Halberda,
2012; Solomon, Morgan, & Chubb, 2011). These models are appli-
cable for situations where external noise is added and systemati-
cally varied. The application of this model is substantially limited
if there is no external noise (e.g. there is only one test or several
tests with equal size). For instance, in the absence of the external
noise it is impossible to separate early and late noise in the Solo-
mon’s model since in the formula they are represented as two al-
most identical addends into which a sum can be arbitrarily split.
This model is also based on an unproven assumption that neigh-
boring elements are pooled together in an effectively noise-free
way which is a retraction from the basic Thurstonian postulate.
However, the most distinctive feature of this and other models that
have been inspired by the signal detection theory is that they are
formulated in terms of macroscopic variables (mean and variances
of distributions from which circle diameters are supposedly
drawn). In this respect they resemble the purely phenomenological
theory of gases which was devised by Gay-Lussac and his contem-
poraries to describe the relationships between macroscopically ob-
served variables (e.g., pressure and volume are inversely
proportional). This theory was soon replaced by the kinetic theory
of gases which describes a gas by the random motion of a large
number of small particles (atoms or molecules) which collide with
each other and the walls of the container. These collisions explain
the macroscopic properties of gases, such as pressure, temperature,
and volume.
In variance from previous explanations, the proposed N&S mod-
el describes every single stimulus element and postulates simple
rules how measures of these elements are transformed into the
judgement. No commitments whatsoever were made on the distri-
bution from which circle diameters were drawn. In the result only
two variables were needed to describe all data of how the mean
size is judged by the human observer. These two variables repre-
senting two very simple principles can be easily implemented into
a mathematical formula, or just a few lines of programming
language which simulates the observer’s judgments. In addition
to transparency, these two familiar principles have very clear
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basis for Thurstonian psychophysical analyses, states that there is
always an irreducible amount of internal noise, due to which ex-
actly the same physical size is transformed into a set of psycholog-
ical states corresponding to slightly different perceived sizes. The
second principle states that the capacity to process relevant infor-
mation is limited to a certain number of elements which can be ta-
ken into account in the judgment. An obvious consequence of this
second principle is that, if the number of elements exceeds the
capacity limitation, then there must be a considerable number of
elements for which existence is simply ignored in stimulus pro-
cessing. Of course, the idea that the observer’s ability to receive,
process, and remember is severely limited in terms of the amount
of information was one of the most basic discoveries in psychology
long before George Miller’s published his magical 7 ± 2 (cf., Jevons,
1871). What is perhaps less common in our proposal is that these
two principles – internal noise and capacity limitation – need to be
applied simultaneously (see also Im & Halberda, 2012; Solomon,
Morgan, & Chubb, 2011). A sufﬁciently general theory of mean size
perception cannot be built on only one of these two basic
principles.
Unfortunately, neither internal noise nor capacity limitation can
be treated as some sort of psychological constant. Unlike physical
constants like elementary electric charge, the minimal internal
noise is not identical for all observers and can vary dependent on
stimulus value. If the internal noise and maximal number of pro-
cessed elements are not constants, there should nevertheless be
some basic rules that apply to them. For example, even this study
added additional evidence in support of the well-established rule
that internal noise is proportional to the estimated size, irrespec-
tive of whether this is of a single object or the mean size of multi-
ple objects. Similarly, we could expect that analogous rules could
relate internal noise and capacity limitation either to some other
stimulus properties or the observer’s psychological state (e.g., fati-
gue). It was certainly a signiﬁcant observation that internal noise
depended on the distribution of values along internal number
scales. Internal noise was smaller when values were grouped
around the same mean value, rather than when there was consid-
erable disparity between them (Study 3). Although there is not en-
ough food for substantial speculation, it looks as it is indeed costly
to divide attention between two disparate regions of the internal
number line. Another way to express the same idea is to say that
the observer is not only sensitive to individual sizes but also to
higher order moments (e.g. variance) of distribution of sizes (cf.
Solomon, Morgan, & Chubb, 2011). However, the number of such
kind of established rules is very limited, to say the least. Since
we know very little indeed about the factors which determine or
at least restrict internal noise and/or capacity limits, we cannot
pretend that the proposed theory is genuinely universal.
One of the largest theoretical challenges is a coupling of these
two principles, internal noise and capacity limitation. Although,
in theory, they are clearly distinct concepts, the effects they exert
on the slope of the psychometric discrimination function are very
similar. For instance, it is very easy to see why the slope of the psy-
chometric discrimination function becomes more ﬂat with an in-
crease in internal noise. Similarly, it is understandable why
discrimination functions become more ﬂat when the observer
starts to omit elements which are available but, due to a capacity
limitation, cannot be used for judgment. Both of these two factors
lead to a loss in the amount of visual information used, which is re-
ﬂected in the ﬂattening of the psychometric discrimination func-
tion. Mathematically at least, these two causes produce changes
in the slope of the psychometric function which are formally
inseparable (Raidvee et al., 2011). This leads us to some kind
uncertainty principle: although it is indisputable that two factors
– internal noise and capacity limitation – affect mean sizejudgment simultaneously, there seems to be a limitation on the
precision with which values of these two factors – K and 1 – can
be simultaneously determined.
9. Conclusions
It is surprising that observers ignore, in some conditions at
least, the size of individual elements and their judgments corre-
spond only to the mean size of a subsample of objects. This is
the strongest proof so far that the observer computes one of the
ensemble characteristics – the mean size – sufﬁciently close to
the statistical summary. By testing the associative law of summa-
tion, this study provided rigorous proof for the perception of the
mean size, which has, thus far, been more often presumed than fas-
tidiously demonstrated. There was no need to propose a new
mechanism for average size perception. Two familiar psychophys-
ical principles – the size of an element cannot be measured with
absolute accuracy and only a limited number of elements can be
taken into account in the computation of the average size – were
enough to formulate a formal model, the N&S model, which accu-
rately predicts all mean size empirical discrimination functions.
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